POPULATION TODAY

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FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

It's been cropping up every year lately. What to do about the "year 2000"? Or 2000. Or '00. Or whatever. This must be a question plaguing statisticians and prognosticators everywhere. For years, 2000 has been like a comfortable old quilt. Since we have very few sound ideas about the world's future, statistically, economically, or otherwise, why not project things to a nice, round benchmark?

Like 2000, which has always seemed like a natural target date. Not only does it end a millennium (or bi-millennium—at any rate, 2,000 big ones), but two-oh-anything always has a futuristic ring when struck with a hard object.

Why bring all this up when the world has other, larger problems? Because 2000 is getting too close.

Each year, when we prepare the *World Population Data Sheet*, a great deal of PRB discussion centers on just what information should be included. How we fuss and worry. Population projections are obviously high on the list of *Data Sheet* users' needs, but for what year? In recent times, 2020 projections have appeared along with 2000, in recognition of the fact that there is probably life beyond the 20th century. But when should 2000 be dropped? 1999? 1998? 199—?

On the one hand, 14 years in the future is only a wink of the eye away, demographically speaking. Only the most radical changes in birth and death rates could have any significant effect on population size by 2000, so—why not drop it?

On the other hand—the year 2000!—what a magical incantation! Not to mention that however close demographically, 14 years in the future is still far over the horizon for specialists in such fields as economics, labor force, and the environment.

This—the question for those of you who use the *Data Sheet*. When should we drop the year 2000 and what years should we show in its place? 2010? 2015? 2026? Or what? Please drop a line and tell us. We'd really like to know.

Carl Haub
Demographic Editor

SPEAKING GRAPHICALLY

L. Perozzo's figure, published in 1861, shows a cylinder with a vertical axis. Each vertical cross section of the cylinder represents a particular year. Within each cross section the age groups radiate out from a common low center. The higher the angle of the protrusion, the younger the age group. The cross sections are arranged in a fan around the central cylinder in chronological order, bulging higher in more recent years (toward the right). Staring at Perozzo's cube in the air, the reader can gain insight into the age structure of Swedish men from 1750 to 1825, or at least realize that mind-bending graphic illustration existed long before electronic computers.

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Links Between Population and Economic Growth

What role does slower population growth play in improving standards of living for people of the world's less developed countries (LDCs)? Overall, "slower population growth would be beneficial to economic development for most of the developing world," according to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which was commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to assess the current population situation in light of today's continuing debate about population growth.

The annual rate of population growth for the LDCs was 2.1 percent in 1950-1955, it peaked at 2.55 percent in 1965-1970, and by 1980-1985 it had fallen to 2.0 percent. Sustained population growth of this magnitude is unprecedented in history and reflects the dramatic fall of mortality rates after World War II, combined with consistently high fertility rates.

Before the 1980s high rates of population growth were almost universally regarded with trepidation. Given the limits of the earth's resources and the extended period of child dependency, the negative effects of rapid population growth seemed self-evident. As such, the issue was not the subject of a great deal of research. Early reports, among them Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover's 1958 book *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, along with the NAS-sponsored 1971 work *Rapid Population Growth—Consequences and Policy Implications*, found seriously negative economic consequences of rapid population growth. This pessimistic view was most recently presented in the widely publicized *Global 2000 Report to the President* in 1980.

Rise of Revisionism

This negative view of population growth has been questioned in the 1980s, as it has become clear that despite rapid population growth, developing countries have achieved unprecedented levels of per capita income, literacy, and life expectancy over the past quarter century.

Julian Simon's 1981 book *The Ultimate Resource* challenged conventional wisdom by arguing that population is an important, long-term stimulus to economic advancement through its effects on productive technology, the pace of innovation, the formation of markets, and governmental infrastructural investments. Simon's book received a good deal of publicity among scholars and the general public alike, and has been warmly received by the present Administration.

> The NAS report generally portrays slower population growth as a positive factor in development.

Against this background, AID asked the NAS to undertake a new assessment. The work, funded by private sources as well, represents an extensive effort to synthesize the recent research on the economic consequences of population growth. The Working Group on Population Growth and Economic Development of NAS's Committee on Population prepared the report, which was issued this month, and encompasses two volumes: the first, *Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions*, summarizes much recent research. The second, *Population Growth and Economic Development: Background Papers*, contains the 17 commissioned papers on important aspects of economic-demographic relations.

Grappling with the Tricky Ones

In carefully worded language, the report addresses nine currently debated questions regarding various aspects of the population/development link. These questions run the gamut from whether or not slower population growth would increase the growth rate of per capita income by increasing per capita availability of resources (both exhaustible and renewable) to whether lower population densities lower per capita income because of reduced incentives for technological innovation and inability to take advantage of economies of scale. The report also addresses the effect of a couple's fertility behavior on society at large.

In general, slower population growth is portrayed as a positive factor in achieving development, though the report identifies a few positive aspects of population growth, for example, its role in stimulating conservation (see below). However, the report repeatedly stresses that rapid population growth can exacerbate the ill effects of a variety of policy failures, including urban bias, direct and indirect food subsidies which distort agricultural markets, credit market distortions, and inadequate common property management.

A sampling of the study's conclusions:

- Slower population growth may delay the time at which a particular stage of depletion of an exhaustible resource is reached. Though it seems

Continued on page 8

Where Are the World's 10 Million Refugees?

In the past, refugees have sought asylum primarily in Europe and other developed areas. Today, however, the majority of the world's approximately 10 million refugees are from developing countries seeking asylum in other developing countries. About 80 percent of the refugees have turned to asylum in Southeast Asia, South and East Africa, the Near East and South Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. These regions, termed "crisis areas" by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), contain large numbers of refugees in need of protection and assistance.

Afghan refugees. The largest refugee population in the world today is the estimated 3.5 million Afghans currently sheltered in Pakistan (2.5 million) and Iran (1 million) caused by the Soviet invasion of 1979.

Because of its strong political and cultural ties with Afghanistan, the Pakistani government has permitted many of the refugees to work and move about without restriction. But while many of the refugees have blended into Pakistani life, the sheer numbers of refugees sheltered in some areas have contributed to a strain on resources and the economy and have created social tensions with the indigenous population. To relieve some of the financial burden, UNHCR and other international organizations are implementing various income-generating projects for the refugees, to decrease their dependence on outside aid.

Although the Pakistani and Iranian governments have welcomed the Afghan refugees, they are viewed as temporary residents who will eventually return to their country. However, continued Soviet attacks on civilians in Afghanistan makes repatriation an unlikely outcome in the near future.

Indochinese refugees. Since 1975, about 1.6 million Indochinese have sought asylum in Southeast and East Asia. The number of refugees leaving Indochina peaked in 1979 when Vietnam's government expelled many Vietnamese of Chinese descent. As of mid-1985, the number of Indochinese refugees was reduced to 360,000, mainly through successful efforts to resettle many of the refugees. A total of approximately 1.5 million refugees have found permanent homes. The U.S. has the largest number of resettled Indochinese (750,000).

Africa. Nearly 3 million refugees are scattered throughout Africa, including over 1 million Ethiopians - the single largest group - currently sheltered in Sudan and Somalia. Continued fighting between government forces and liberation movements, as well as severe drought, have pushed these people from their homes.

Sudan and Somalia, like most African nations, have a generous policy of granting temporary asylum to those who seek it. The large number of refugees settled in these countries has major social, political and economic implications for their development.

In Somalia, one of every eight persons is a refugee. Even with assistance from UNHCR, the extra inhabitants put a strain on the country's economy; the per capita GNP of Somalia is US$282. Resources are strained and development projects have suffered. AC

MAIN GROUPS OF CURRENT, UNSETTLED WORLD REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF ASYLUM

AFRICA
Angola. 70,000 refugees from Namibia; 13,000 from Zaire; 9,000 from S. Africa
Benin. 3,600 refugees from Chad
Botswana. 1,600 refugees from Zimbabwe
Ethiopia. 72,000 refugees from Sudan
Lesotho. 11,500 refugees from S. Africa
Nigeria. 4,000 refugees from Chad
Senegal. 7,000 from Guinea-Bissau
Somalia. 700,000 Ethiopians
Sudan. 384,000 Ethiopians; 200,000 Ugandans; 5,000 refugees from Zaire; 4,000 from Chad
Swaziland. 10,000 refugees from S. Africa
Tanzania. 153,500 refugees from Burundi; 15,000 refugees from Zaire; 2,500 from Rwanda; and 7,000 from other countries
Zaire. 265,000 refugees from Angola; 20,000 from Uganda; 12,000 from Burundi; and Rwanda; and 40,000 from Zambia and other countries
Zambia. 75,000 refugees from Angola; 9,500 refugees from Zaire; 7,000 from Namibia; 2,500 from S. Africa
Zimbabwe. 10,000 from Mozambique

ASIA
Hong Kong. 10,734 Indochinese
Indonesia. 7,890 Indochinese refugees
Malaysia. 9,155 Indochinese refugees
Thailand. 127,476 Indochinese refugees

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Costa Rica. 16,000 refugees from El Salvador and Nicaragua
Guatemala. Approximately 70,000 refugees from El Salvador
Honduras. 18,000 refugees from El Salvador and Nicaragua
Mexico. Approximately 170,000 refugees from Guatemala and El Salvador

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Jordan. 800,000 Palestinian refugees
Gaza Strip. 430,000 Palestinian refugees
Iran. 1,000,000 refugees from Afghanistan
Lebanon. 300,000 Palestinian refugees
Pakistan. 2,500,000 refugees from Afghanistan
Syria. 280,000 Palestinian refugees

The U.S. Reaches 240 Million

The United States is now a nation of 240 million people.

As of Nov. 1, 1985, according to unreleased Census Bureau estimates, the U.S. population reached 240,123,000. ("Population Update" on page 9 reprints the latest *published* estimate, which is for Oct. 1.)

When the most recent Census Bureau estimates were prepared, the U.S. was growing at about 215,000 people per month (166,000 in natural increase, or surplus of births over deaths, and 50,000 net immigration). The Bureau's estimates take into account estimated emigration of 160,000 per year, and net undocumented immigration of 200,000 per year. The population total includes armed forces overseas.

These rates give the U.S. a growth rate of about 1 percent annually, fairly high for a more developed country (e.g., the United Kingdom's growth rate is 0.1 percent). At these rates, the U.S. would add about 1 million people every five months, and reach the quarter-billion milestone about 1990.

The Netherlands: No More Censuses?

A population census every 10 years – that was the stipulation of the Census Law of the Netherlands of April 22, 1879. For almost a century, excepting the period of World War II when the 1940 Census was delayed until 1947, the Netherlands' census schedule was faithfully adhered to.

Then, with the coming of the 1971 Census, grassroots census resistance started to build – resistance to a government considered by some to be rather too inquisitive and too prone to prying into the lives of its citizens. The specter was raised, not for the first time, of Jews and resistance workers being rounded up during the war by German occupation forces who had access to perfectly organized and updated population registers, and this touched a note of sympathy in many.

A new Census Law was adopted on July 9, 1970. It contained many more regulations and safeguards than the previous one (for example, all census information containing names and addresses was to be destroyed by a specific date) but that did not allay everyone's fears. The number of persons who ultimately refused to cooperate or were not at home during the 1971 Census exceeded 50,000, and many more did not answer the questions as truthfully as the law required. And the number of refusers alone – 23,000 – was too large to prosecute and fine or jail.

In 1979, with the time nearing for the

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

Traditional houses in Zwolle, The Netherlands

SURVEY REPORT

Morocco

The Kingdom of Morocco sits astride the northwest corner of Africa, separated from Europe by the Straits of Gibraltar. The country covers an area about that of the states of Washington and Oregon combined and also lays claim to the former Spanish colonial areas of Western Sahara to the south. This claim is generally not recognized by other countries.

Morocco's 1982 Census counted 20,419,555 inhabitants, a figure seen as surprisingly low by some observers. This may be due to the country's slowly decreasing birth rate. The government has set a definite goal for a rate of 35 births per 1,000 population by 1985, down from 53 in the late 1950s. The policy does seem to have worked, although that specific target may not have been met.

Agriculture is a mainstay of the economy, with about one-half of the work force engaged in it. There are two distinct sectors in the agricultural economy: large efficient farms irrigated with government subsidies and earning export capital and smaller, less efficient family plots located on more marginal land.

As a part of its effort to gather demographic data, Morocco has taken several surveys, the most recent of which is the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (CPS) of 1983-1984. As with other CPSs, this survey was taken by a national agency, the Public Health Ministry, with the assistance of Westinghouse Health Systems and funding from USAID.

The survey indicates that knowledge of contraception is quite high in Morocco. About 90 percent of the ever-married women interviewed said that they had heard of a method, with the pill receiving the most recognition. About 40 percent of the women said that they were using a modern method, an additional 5 percent were using a traditional one such as rhythm. This represents a 53 percent increase in contraceptive prevalence since the last survey, conducted in 1980. The surveys are, however, somewhat inconclusive about what effect this prevalence may have had upon national fertility levels. The total fertility rate is around 5.0-5.5 births per woman, and estimates given in the survey do suggest that there was very little actual drop in fertility, despite the increased use of family planning. At the time of the 1980 survey, 12.3 percent of the respondents were pregnant, while the corresponding figure for the 1983-1984 CPS was 13.5.

When questioned as to their future fertility plans, two-thirds of the women in urban areas said that they did not wish to have any more births, and slightly less than half of those in rural areas stated likewise. This varied with many factors, as expected, about half of those with 3 living children said that they did want additional future births. *CH*

DEMOGRAPHER'S PAGE

Geographical Polarization of Whites and Minorities in Large U.S. Cities: 1960-1980

by Morton D. Winsberg

The 38 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the United States, those with 1 million or more inhabitants, held 40 percent of the nation's population in 1980, the same as they did in 1960.* During this 20-year interval, these SMSAs' share of the nation's non-Hispanic white population remained a constant 38 percent.

The share of the nation's minorities within these SMSAs, however, increased dramatically during this period. This has occurred because of rural-urban migration and migration from overseas. Whereas in 1960 the 38 areas held 42 percent of the nation's blacks, by 1980 the share had risen to 51 percent. During the same period the percentage of the nation's Hispanics living in these cities increased from 57 percent to 60 percent and Asians (here defined as people from South, Southeast, and East Asia) rose from 34 percent to 50 percent.

During the same 20-year period, the percentage of non-Hispanic whites fell proportionately from 64 to 73 percent of these SMSAs' populations, and in seven SMSAs the group's absolute numbers fell. In contrast, between 1960 and 1980, minority groups increased their share of these SMSAs' population—blacks from 11 percent to 15 percent, Asians from 1 percent to 3 percent, and Hispanics* from 2 percent to 10 percent.

In the Central Cities

During this period also, the central cities of the 37 largest SMSAs (the 38th does not have a central city) experienced a shift of population to the suburbs. In 1960, these central cities held half the total population of their SMSA; by 1980, despite considerable annexation of suburbs by some central cities, the central cities' share of their SMSAs' inhabitants had dropped to 39 percent.

This shift has occurred for all population groups though especially for non-Hispanic whites. Despite the much publicized return of non-Hispanic whites to the central cities, a greater share of this group can afford to live in the suburbs than can minorities—and in 1980, non-Hispanic whites constituted 50 percent or less of the total population in the central cities of 11 of these SMSAs.**

> Unique among the largest SMSAs, Los Angeles saw its polarization rate fall by 6 percent

A geographical polarization has resulted, with non-Hispanic whites concentrating in the suburbs and the minorities concentrating in the central cities. This well-recognized phenomenon has been identified as underlying several critical social problems facing our large cities.

Except for Ft. Lauderdale, all the central cities of the 38 largest SMSAs experienced a decline in the share of non-Hispanic whites in the total central-city population (see table on page 7). Interestingly, the share of non-Hispanic whites in the outer city's total population also declined in all but three SMSAs (Ft. Lauderdale, Sacramento, and Tampa).

Four Kinds of Cities

In short, data suggest that during the period 1960-1980, in most large SMSAs, minorities and non-Hispanic whites have become geographically polarized relative to one another. The rate of this polarization was calculated and appears in the table.

The calculation was done by comparing the percentage-point difference between the central and outer cities in their proportion of non-Hispanic whites in 1960 and again in 1980, and then subtracting the 1960 difference from that of 1980. In all but one case (Los Angeles, see below) the difference was greater in 1980 than in 1960, indicating increased polarization.

Since some minorities have scaled the economic ladder more rapidly than others and have easier access to the suburbs, it is appropriate to categorize the 38 SMSAs by the proportion of the three minority groups in their total population. The table divides the SMSAs into four groups of cities as of 1980: *Asian* where Asians (a small minority in most SMSAs) held at least a 25-percent share of the minority population; *black*, where blacks constituted at least 70 percent of the minority population; *Hispanic*, where Hispanics made up at least half of the minority population; and *black-Hispanic*, where the proportion of blacks was between 50 and 70 percent and Hispanics 25 and 45 percent.

Little Polarization Change

Examination of the table reveals considerable differences between the four groups of cities in rates of polarization between non-Hispanic whites and minorities in 1960-1980. In general (considering the great variation among cities within the same group), polarization was low in all SMSAs where minorities constituted a low percentage of the total population, i.e., Buffalo, Boston, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Portland, and Seattle. While the minorities in these cities grew much faster than the non-Hispanic whites during 1960-1980,

*SMSA was upgraded in 1980 by a new definition. Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); see PT, November 1985, for a discussion of the old and new definitions.

**Unique among the largest SMSAs, Los Angeles saw its polarization rate fall by 6 percent. [illegible] Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New Orleans, San Antonio, and San Francisco.

Morton D. Winsberg is professor of geography at Florida State University.

polarization still was much less than that in many other SMSAs.

In addition, low polarization—as evident in several SMSAs—the District of Columbia, as well as Cleveland and Houston—that contained large minority populations and large central city/outer city differences in composition.

High Polarization Change

In several SMSAs, however, polarization between 1960 and 1980 grew significantly while the non-Hispanic white population grew only slowly or actually declined. This suggests that the increased polarization was due to a dramatic shift of whites from the central city to the suburbs. The most extreme case is the Detroit SMSA, where the non-Hispanic white population grew 5 percent during the 20-year period, while the black population (constituting 85 percent of minorities) grew by over 80 percent, due largely to in-migration from the South.

Chicago, Miami, New York, Newark, and San Antonio experienced similar increases of polarization, even though their non-Hispanic white populations decreased.

The SMSA of Los Angeles deserves special attention. Here, the non-Hispanic white population fell 12 percent between 1960 and 1980, while the minority population grew by 260 percent. Yet, unique among the SMSAs studied here, polarization between Los Angeles' non-Hispanic whites and minorities fell by 6 percent.

This decline in polarization over the 20-year period was in great part due to a slight increase in the percentage of non-Hispanic whites living within the central city, but a sharp decline in the central city's share of blacks and Asians. There was no substantial change in the number of Hispanics living there.

Conclusions

For polarization to decrease, either the central city has to become more attractive to non-Hispanic whites or minorities have to achieve greater affluence to permit them access to the suburbs. Substantial evidence indicates that Asians are now rapidly scaling the economic ladder and that many are moving to the suburbs. There will not, however, be a major relative shift of the group to the suburbs at a faster rate than immigration from Asia continues, since the central city will continue to be their reception area.

Hispanics are another group moving to the suburbs, but at a slower rate than the Asians. The proportion of this group who will be living in the suburbs in the future depends on their immigration volume, the majority of which is likely to be to the central city.

The movement of blacks to the suburbs is slower than that of the other two groups. Given the obstacles this group has faced while scaling the economic ladder, it is doubtful their suburbanization will be much more advanced in 1980 from what it was in 1980. It is also hard to imagine conditions in the central city of most large SMSAs becoming so desirable as to stimulate non-Hispanic whites to move inward from the suburbs.

Polarization of Non-Hispanic Whites and Minorities Between Central City and Outer City: 1960-1980

SMSA ordered by group	% Minorities in SMSA (1980)	Non-Hispanic Whites: % in total population — Central City 1960	Central City 1980	Outer City 1960	Outer City 1980	Polarization rate* (1980-1960)
Asian group						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+8
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+5
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+25
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+13
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+7
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+8
Black group						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+24
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+17
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+14
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+12
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+11
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+6
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+14
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+1
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+1
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+1
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+10
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+17
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+29
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+18
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+11
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+8
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+12
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+14
Hispanic group						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+17
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+21
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+6
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+25
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+11
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+12
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+28
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+1
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+11
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+12
Black-Hispanic group						
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+18
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NAS Report

Continued from page 3

unlikely that slower population growth will allow a larger number of people to enjoy a given standard of living thanks to lower natural resource prices; slower population growth in essence "buys time" to prepare for a particular state of resource depletion.

- Slower population growth is likely to lead to a reduced rate of degradation of renewable common-property resources such as air, water, and species of plants and animals. In the long run, however, population growth might encourage proper use of such resources by making them scarce, driving up their value, and creating greater incentives to develop the social and political institutions necessary for conservation—provided, of course, that the resource has not become depleted beyond the point of restoration.
- Lower fertility is likely to increase average per child levels of household expenditure on health and education, and thereby improve levels of child health and education—depending on the distribution among income classes of the fertility decline. In addition, slower population growth is likely to raise public expenditures on schooling per school-aged child, and such a result may lead to some improvement in educational quality, as measured, for example, by test scores.
- Unless the fertility decline is concentrated among high-income families, slower population growth is likely to lead to a reduction in income disparities among social classes.
- When national fertility levels fall, cities will grow more slowly, both in the short and long run, through reduced natural increase. The evidence on whether reduced national fertility levels reduce the rate of rural-urban migration, and hence reduce the rate of growth of the *proportion* urban, is unclear.
- Important as environmental and climatic conditions may be to conditioning the economic response to population growth, they appear to be far less important than conditions created by people. Many of the initial effects of population growth are negative, but these effects can be ameliorated or even reversed in the long run if institutional adjustment mechanisms are in place.

Conclusion

The report concludes that slower population growth generally helps economic development in most LDCs, and advocates government family planning programs as the best policy to achieve these lower rates. It points out that careful scientific research is needed both to better quantify and to further elucidate most of the relationships discussed therein.

The report deems voluntary family planning programs the most conventional and direct instrument of government population policy, writing that, "In summary, there is little debate about the desirability of programs that allow couples access to easy, affordable, and effective means of family planning, even among those who see population growth as neutral or even a positive influence on development."

Recognizing that when a couple's childbearing decision imposes external costs on other families, the report agrees a case may be made for policies that go "beyond family planning." It lists incentives and disincentives toward smaller families as the least undesirable method of government intervention but asserts that "there is no current evidence to suggest that population externalities are severe enough to warrant the imposition of drastic financial or legal restrictions on childbearing." —*TA*

Demo-Sources—First of a Series

Surely 90 percent of knowing something in the population field is knowing where to find it, which can be a difficult proposition in a world of 216 countries (depending on how you count them), with different senses of urgency about gathering and publishing data.

Nonetheless, standard demographic and population-related reference sources do exist, such as: subject encyclopedias and handbooks; bibliographies and indexes; demographic and statistical yearbooks; and census publications. Any of these can be a lifesaver when a particular fact (e.g., the number of 5-year-olds in Thailand) is needed pronto.

What are they? Where are they available? With this article, PT inaugurates a series on standard demographic and population reference sources, prepared by PRB's Librarian Denise Molato.

International Encyclopedia of Population; editor in chief, John A. Ross (Center for Population and Family Health, International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction, Faculty of Medicine, Columbia University) (2 vols.) New York, The Free Press, 1982. 750 pages, illus. $145.00.

Along with a trend toward ever-more-specialized publications has come a boom in specialized subject encyclopedias. The *International Encyclopedia of Population* (IEP) is so far the only comprehensive subject encyclopedia in population. Directed toward a broad, international audience, the IEP's 129 medium-length, signed articles—many written by well-known specialists in the field—avoid excessive technicality. Its level of difficulty is geared to population professionals reading outside their own specialties. The articles are organized around 11 broad topics: the field of population, data sources, population dynamics, fertility (determinants and regulation), marriage and divorce, morbidity and mortality, population distribution, population and natural resources, population laws and policies, regions and countries, and population organizations and agencies. Because the book concentrates on present-day knowledge, the historical aspects of demography and biographies are excluded (although the basic history of major study areas is included).

The articles themselves range widely, from, say, one on breastfeeding by John Knodel to a masterly exposition by Gavin Jones of theories on fertility determinants. Geographic coverage is provided through separate articles on the 11 most populous countries (in order) China, India, the Soviet Union, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Japan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Mexico, plus Canada. All other countries are covered in regional entries, e.g., Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and Southwest Asia, etc.

Though the IEP has some minor flaws, the most urgent concern is that no revision is planned by the publisher of this benchmark work. The editors anticipated this and concentrated on demographic trends and projections, rather than on current data. By doing so, the value of the *IEP* as a reference source for classic articles at the outset of the 1980s period is assured; however, without a revision the long-range *ready* reference value one expects from a subject encyclopedia is limited.

Defending Nations Requires More Than Arms

If countries are to deal with deteriorating ecologies and mounting debts, they can no longer continue to boost expenditures on armaments, according to *State of the World 1986*, third in a series of assessments published by the Worldwatch Institute, a Washington-based research group.

The steady expansion of the world economy for most of a generation has heretofore permitted both more guns and more butter, but for many countries this age has come to an end. Environmental decline and economic deficits may now be a greater threat to national security than armed aggression, the report states.

Along with military expansion, other topics explored in the report include innovations in water conservation, new trends in electricity generation, the financial challenge of decommissioning nuclear power plants (which can be as expensive as constructing them), and the health costs of worldwide tobacco smoking. In order to present a broad view, the authors highlight positive initiatives a few countries have undertaken in every area to provide models for the rest of the world.

The Worldwatch study found that global military expenditures grew steadily over the last quarter-century, outpacing the growth of the world economy. "Global military outlays in 1985 exceeded the income of the poorest half of humanity," observed Lester R. Brown, president of the Worldwatch Institute and director of the study. "For many Third World countries, the choice is either continued militarization or the restoration of the economy's environmental support systems."

The study applauds countries such as China, Argentina, and Peru for cutting military outlays. According to the report, China and Argentina have reduced by half the share of GNP used for military purposes over the last several years. —*JA*

Copies of *State of the World 1986*, by Lester R. Brown, William C. Chandler, Christopher Flavin, Cynthia Pollock, Sandra Postel, Linda Starke, and Edward C. Wolf, are available from PRB at a special price of $6.00 for PRB members. The cost to non-members is $8.95. Orders and checks (made payable to PRB) should be sent to: PRB Circulation Dept., P.O. Box 35012, Washington, DC 20013.

Sun May Be Setting on IUD

Intrauterine devices (IUDs) may soon become a scarce form of birth control in the U.S. In February, the last major IUD manufacturer, G.D. Searle, announced that the company was stopping U.S. sales of the device because of "unwarranted" lawsuits and the practical impossibility of obtaining affordable liability insurance. Searle is the manufacturer of the Copper-7 and TATUM-T IUDs.

There is no reason for women already using an IUD to stop using it, said the company. This view was echoed by medical specialists and Planned Parenthood. Searle emphasized that their decision was an economic, not a health-related issue, and that they considered their devices safe.

Searle's move essentially leaves the U.S. public without a supplier of IUDs. Another major manufacturer, Johnson & Johnson, stopped marketing the Lippes Loop in September 1985. The only domestic marketer of IUDs is now the small California firm of Alza, which makes a hormone-releasing type of IUD.

With 2.15 million U.S. users, the IUD is considered to be the country's third most popular form of birth control, after sterilization and the pill. Critics charged that it is associated with pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) and infertility. And the exceptional defects of one model of IUD, the Dalkon Shield, were such as to cause its manufacturer, A.H. Robins, to go into bankruptcy in 1985.

The basic IUD, however, is a simple form of birth control with no chemical side effects and a high degree of effectiveness (though not as high as the pill's). If it ceases to be a widespread form of contraception, U.S. women will likely have to choose from the other standbys, as a new generation of ultra-effective and convenient contraceptives (implants, vaccines, male pills) is still years from reaching the marketplace. —*AH*

POPULATION UPDATE

Estimated United States Population

As of October 1, 1985	239,929,000
As of October 1, 1984	237,669,000

See page 4 for an advance, unpublished estimate. The above estimates include armed forces overseas, and are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 970.

Estimated World Population

As of March 1986	4,901,000,000
Annual Growth	82,000,000

Estimated by extrapolation of the mid-1985 world population given on PRB's 1985 World Population Data Sheet.

Latest Provisional Statistics for the U.S.: October 1985

	12 months ending with October					
	Number		Rate			
Item	1985	1984	1985	1984	1983	1982
Live births	3,754,000	3,669,000	15.8	15.6	15.7	15.9
Deaths	2,088,000	2,033,000	8.8	8.6	8.6	8.6
Natural increase	1,666,000	1,636,000	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.3
Marriages	2,432,000	2,469,000	10.2	10.5	10.5	10.8
Divorces	1,187,000	1,160,000	5.0	4.9	5.1	5.1
Infant deaths	39,300	38,900	10.4	10.6	11.1	11.4
Population base (in millions)			237.9	235.8	233.4	231.1

Note: Rates are given per 1,000 population, except for infant deaths, which are given per 1,000 live births. Rates are based on revised population estimates from the 1980 Census.

Source: *Monthly Vital Statistics Report* (Vol. 34, No. 10) from the National Center for Health Statistics.

Dutch Census

Continued from page 5

1980-1981 Census, two noncompulsory pilot tests yielded such high nonresponse rates that upon the advice of the statistical authorities the responsible Minister proposed to Parliament on June 2, 1980 that the impending census be postponed. This proposal was accepted, and it was decided not to hold a census before 1981.

This decision was considered an indefinite postponement by many, and in fact no census has been held. The law still stipulates that a census should be held in 1981 or 1991. However, the Central Statistical Commission has already advised the Minister not to submit the necessary proposal to Parliament.

Based on the above decisions and many people's readings of the national mood, census taking may not now be a viable form of data collection in the Netherlands. Whether the Census Law will be officially repealed is unclear; it is quite possible that for the next half century or so, a solemn decision not to conduct a census will be made at regular 10-year intervals.

The consequences of not taking a regular census are many, though for a country such as the Netherlands they should not be exaggerated. The Netherlands has a universal population register that records births, deaths, and changes of residence as they occur. Yearly register counts, soon to be done automatically, generate population figures for even the smallest areas, and special surveys on labor force participation, housing requirements, and so on yield data roughly comparable to those obtained through a census.

Nevertheless, a population and housing census is an unrivaled source of multivariate data. And at present the country is left on the one hand with the problems of providing many varied societal services while being unable to gather the kind of data that would help the distribution of such services.

Correction

In "Conflict in Central America: The Demographic Dimension," the PRB *Population Trends and Public Policy* paper for February 1986, the numbers along the y-axis of Figure 1 should have been labeled "Population in thousands."

TAKE A NUMBER

Capital Improvement: The population of Washington, DC, has ceased declining, according to US Census Bureau estimates. This reflects a trend in other large US cities which have seen previous population losses taper off in the 1980s. Thus it would seem that what one local bank trumpets as "the most important city in the world" in their TV ads (as to the most important bank in the ... US in no immediate danger of disappearing.

Kinder Preferences: Concern over low birth rates is becoming more evident in the low fertility countries of Europe. With West Germany's total fertility rate of 1.3 children per woman, the world's lowest. As we have noted in this space, one does wonder just how low a country's birth rate can go (the nation that does the limbo goes into limbo?) and whether the low fertility is a result of actual desired family size or some other factor.

Survey data from West Germany through 1980 give some surprising insights into attitudes in the country. In 1980, 60 percent of Germans indicated that 2 children constituted the "ideal" family size, according to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann of the Institut für Demoskopie. The proportion feeling that one child is ideal or right has not changed much since the 1960s, holding steady at about 11 percent. Overall, the average rose from about 2.2 children in 1950 to 2.4 in 1964 and appears to have held steady in recent years at 2.1—a figure which just happens to correspond exactly with "replacement level" (the average number of children per woman needed to ensure eventual stabilization of population size). These data are reproduced graphically in *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980*, a 1981 book by the above author.

New World Bank Projections Released: The World Bank has released its most recent series of long-range projections for the world's countries, and they suggest a world population size of 10.7 billion when population growth stabilizes, sometime in the 22nd century. A more complete review of these projections will follow in a future issue of *PT*, but here are a few highlights. Africa is projected to rise to 2.6 billion, assuming that fertility on that continent decreases to the 2-children-per-woman level by 2040. India at 1.7 billion would outstrip China's 1.6 billion, assuming a two-child average for India by 2030. The Bank's numbers, prepared by Mr. Thi Vu, are the only widely available set of projections that take individual countries' populations into the 22nd century; they also feature each country's age structure and selected vital rates.

ADDENDA

Signs of the Inexorable Aging of America—III

Sitting in front of their sets, U.S. TV watchers are not getting any younger. Responding to this national age shift, the networks now offer considerably heftier and "seasoned" fare (e.g., Edward Woodward starring as a less youth-oriented Hart to Hart, and Harry Morgan serving Cosmo on Blacke's Magic). And those whose younger members are at the helm and The Golden Girls, shown at left, generally cutting on clockwise from top: Rue McClanahan, Betty White, Estelle Getty, and Bea Arthur).

CURRENT READINGS

PRB welcomes materials on population topics for possible inclusion in Current Readings. Publishers may address review copies to Book Review Editor, POPULATION TODAY, Population Reference Bureau, 777 14th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1985

by Ruth Leger Sivard. (10th ed.) Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1985. 52 pages. $5.00. ISBN 0-918281-03-6.

Sivard's reference work, now in its 10th edition, compares military expenditures to social expenditures in 142 countries. The array of data includes figures on GNP, education, health, human rights, nutrition, and water.

This compendium provides ammunition on the awesome military buildup since World War II with diverse charts, graphs and maps. Sivard points out how exaggerated military strengths have nourished fears and driven up expenditures. In the arms race research is the instrument that ensures the never-ending escalation of arming: twice as much public money is spent for military research as for all civilian needs combined.

This five-dollar bargain about the world's annual $800 billion weapons bounty, though not encouraging, is a useful defense weapon in its own right for the social scientist as well as for every citizen.

—*Alexander von Gabbe*

ABORTION: Medical Progress and Social Implications. Ciba Foundation Symposium 115,

edited by Ruth Porter and Maeve O'Connor. London: Pitman Publishing, 1985 (distributed in the U.S. by the Medical Education Division, CIBA Pharmaceutical Co., Box 18060, Newark, NJ 07101). 283 pages. $45.00. ISBN 0-272-79815-0.

In November 1984 a diverse group of international experts met in London to present information about abortion in many countries and discuss the implications of recent medical, scientific, and sociological research findings.

One result of the conference was this volume. The fascinating array of topics include coverage of abortion practices in specific areas (England and Wales, Slovenia, the U.S., Japan, Thailand and Sweden, Kenya) along with medical and psychological aspects of abortion (the effects of abortion on a marriage, postabortion and postpartum psychiatric hospitalization).

Ethical aspects of abortion are covered, including Viability and the Moral Status of the Fetus, Politics and Abortion, and Legal Abortion Limits and Contributions to Human Life. One most provocative chapter describes a followup study of 220 children born to Czech women who were twice denied abortions. The study found that these "unwanted" children displayed pronounced negative characteristics relative to the control group of "wanted" children.

For a wide variety of interesting discussion on abortion, readers need look no further than this book. While coverage is not all-encompassing, virtually anyone can find some nugget of wisdom within.

—*Jerome Adams*

SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN 1986.

London: Europa Publications Ltd. (distributed by the Gale Research Co., Detroit, Mich.). 582 pages. 1985. $90.00. ISBN 0-905118-93-1.

This helpful reference will aid anyone in need of a quick overview of any Latin American or Caribbean nation. It starts with sweeping essays on the regions historic, economic and political situations, and then moves to detailed country surveys with overviews of the economy, history, and resources of each nation and a detailed directory including names of national political, trade and industry, and media figures and institutions.

While specialists on individual countries may find that this directory only scratches the surface, most readers will find it an invaluable source of quick and convenient data bites. Some numbers are outdated, but that's to be expected in any reference work that contains such detail. One final bonus is a handy alphabetical guide to the main organizations in or involved with Latin America and the Caribbean.

—*Carol Bradford*

Books Received

CHINA: Urban Statistics 1985, compiled by State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China. (dist. in the U.S. by Gale Research, Detroit, Mich.) 1985. 703 pages. $120.00.

COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS YEARBOOK 1986, edited by Frank L. Bair. Two volumes. Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research, 1985. 1592 pages. $110.00 per set.

THE EXTREME AGED IN AMERICA: A Portrait of an Expanding Population, by Ira Rosenwaike. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. 253 pages. $35.00.

THE FERTILITY REVOLUTION: A Supply-Demand Analysis, by Richard A. Easterlin. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985. 209 pages. $24.95.

HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER: A Social, Economic and Demographic View, by Paula England and George Farkas. New York: Aldine, 1985. 237 pages. $29.95.

LABOR MIGRATION IN THE ATLANTIC ECONOMIES: The European and North American Working Classes During the Period of Industrialization, edited by Dirk Hoerder. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. 491 pages. $55.00.

LATER LIFE TRANSITIONS: Older Males in Rural America, by Edward A. Powers et al. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1985. $34.00.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 1986. London: Europa Publications, Ltd. (Distr. by Gale Research Co., Detroit, Mich.) 1985. 963 pages. $125.00.

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN AFRICA, edited by John I. Clarke et al. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 329 pages. $49.50.

THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1986, edited by James D. Williams. New York: National Urban League, 1986. 220 pages. $18.00.

WHY PEOPLE INTEND TO MOVE: Individual and Community-Level Factors of Out-Migration in the Philippines, by Sun-Hee Lee. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 155 pages. $21.00.

SPOTLIGHT

BOLIVIA

Population (1984 est.): 6.2 million
Land area: 424,160 sq. miles
Births per 1,000 pop.(1983): 42
Deaths per 1,000 pop.(1983): 16
Rate of natural increase (1983): 2.1 percent
Total Fertility rate: 6.3
Infant mortality rate: 124 infant deaths per 1,000 live births
Life expectancy at birth: 51 years
Major exports (1982): tin, petroleum, lead, zinc, silver
Major imports (1982): foodstuffs, chemicals, captial goods
Capital (de facto): La Paz

by Paola Scommegna

Bolivia is a landlocked country in the heart of Latin America. Eighty percent of its population is clustered in the southwestern half of the country, which is divided into two ecological regions: the Altiplano or high plateau, and the Valles, the northeastern arm of the Andean mountain range that surrounds the Altiplano. These two areas contain the country's principal cities, its industrial centers, agricultural heartland, and the mineral deposits that have been the base of its economy.

Bolivia's sparsely populated northeastern half, referred to as the Llanos or lowlands, is covered with dense rain forest interspersed with open savannas that join the Amazon basin. This region contains Bolivia's petroleum, natural gas and iron ore deposits. For the past two decades, government policy has encouraged migration to this region in the hope that industry and cultivation will spur economic development. The Indian population, however, has been reluctant to move.

Sixty percent of Bolivia's 6.2 million people are Indians. Europeans make up between 10 and 15 percent of the population and are primarily of Spanish origin, reflecting Bolivia's colonial past. People of mixed Indian-Spanish heritage comprise the remaining 25-30 percent of the population.

Until the mid-1980s, all government-sponsored education (including literacy programs) was conducted in Castilian Spanish. Thirty-six percent of the population speak only Spanish, 22 percent speak either Quechua or Aymara (the languages of the two major Indian groups), 40 percent are bi- or trilingual, and 2 percent speak other languages.

Bolivia is one of the very poorest countries in Latin America. In fact, as of 1982, Bolivia's GNP per capita of US $530 was less than one-third the Latin American average, and ranked second-lowest (to Haiti) in the Western Hemisphere. Because of such poverty, emigration is a serious problem. Nearly 15 percent of the nation's high school and university graduates leave Bolivia in search of work.

This poverty is reflected in the living conditions of the population. A 1977 UN Food and Agriculture Organization study estimated that 45 percent of the population did not consume the minimum number of calories to maintain health. Only one-third of the population has access to potable water. Only one-third have access to any type of health care, and only two-thirds of the population is literate.

Like most developing countries, Bolivia has a very youthful population: 44 percent of the total population is under 15, while only 4 percent is over age 65. The dependency ratio — the number of children that each 100 adults must support — is 88% in the U.S. and most industrialized countries that figure is more like 47. The population growth rate is 2.7 percent, ensuring continued growth in the school-aged population. Because of the undeveloped land and mineral resources in the Llanos, population growth has been encouraged by the government. After the 1976 Bolivian Census counted 1 million fewer people than estimated, the government-sponsored contraceptive promotion program was canceled in favor of greater emphasis on maternal and child health. Contraceptive usage is negligible.

Urban areas grew almost twice as fast as rural areas during the 1970s, a result of rural-to-urban migration. La Paz, the actual capital city (Sucre is the legal capital), is home to 25 percent of the country's total population.

Demographically, Bolivia is more similar to many sub-Saharan African countries than to its Latin American neighbors. The total fertility rate (TFR) is 6.3 average lifetime births per woman. Among the Aymaran population (who constitute 25 percent of the country's total population), the TFR is 8.5. Despite the youthfulness of the population, Bolivia's death rate is 16 per 1,000, twice as high as the Latin American regional average. Life expectancy at birth in 1985 was 51 years, more than 12 years lower than the regional average.

The high death rates and low life expectancy estimates reflect Bolivia's high infant and child mortality rates. UN estimates place infant mortality at 124 per 1,000 live births. However, recent UNICEF estimates made in Bolivia place infant mortality at a much higher 167 infant deaths per 1,000 live births.

These high infant mortality rates are both evidence of, and the result of, the effects of the worst economic crisis to hit Bolivia in its history. Brought on by a combination of drought and flooding, debt, the remnants of corrupt military rule, and a stagnated tin and natural gas market, this crisis resulted in a drop of 15 percent in the country's GNP between 1980 and 1983.

Paola Scommegna, a former PRB policy analyst, is a Washington freelance writer.

Market scene on the Antiplano in Bolivia